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Abstract
Since the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament wields the power of consent over international
(trade) agreements, enabling it to threaten a veto. Due to the extensive financial and reputational costs associated with
a veto, the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) was expected to read these threats effectively. However,
the Commission’s responses to such threats have varied greatly. Building on a fine‐grained causal mechanism derived
from information processing theory and an extensive process‐tracing analysis of seven free trade agreements post‐Lisbon,
we explain why the Commission has responded differently to looming vetoes. Our analysis reveals that the variation in
Commission responses derives from imperfections in its information‐processing system, the ‘early‐warning system,’ which
had to be adapted to the new institutional equilibrium post‐Lisbon. Because of this adaption process, factors exogenous
to the parliamentary context (‘externalities’) as well as internal uncertainties (‘internalities’) add constant unpredictability
to the Commission’s reading of the European Parliament.
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1. Introduction
With the power to reject international trade agreements,
the European Parliament (hereinafter EP) received a
costly ‘whip’ to sanction the EU negotiator during the
final ratification stage. As this ‘nuclear option’ (Smith,
1999, p. 76) coincided with the politicisation of trade
policy, it was widely anticipated that the EP would flex
these new ‘muscles’ frequently. Considering the high
financial and reputational costs of looming vetoes, one
would expect the European Commission (hereinafter
Commission) to read and react to such threats effectively
(Gastinger, 2016).
Indeed, there have been several cases where the
Commission was uncertain if a majority of Members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) would approve
the agreement and only realised the impending rejec‐
tion later or even too late in the process. Such was
the case with the Anti‐Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA) where late‐stage protests entrapped MEPs to
reject the entire agreement. In other cases such as the
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), the
Commission reacted to demands backed by a major‐
ity of MEPs by re‐opening the concluded negotiations.
Yet again in other cases such as the agreement with
Colombia and Peru (CoPe), the Commission addressed
parliamentarians’ concerns in a more sufficient manner.
Hence, despite the threat of a parliamentary veto hav‐
ing loomed over several cases, the Commission’s reac‐
tion thereto has varied. We therefore pose the research
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question: Why has the Commission read and reacted dif‐
ferently to threats of vetoes?We deliberately distinguish
between a ‘veto threat’ and the ‘threat of a veto’: The ter‐
minology ‘veto threat’ suggests an actor‐centred concept
where A compels B to do something (Cameron, 2000,
p. 85). A ‘threat of a veto,’ on the other hand, suggests a
more situational concept where different variables pro‐
duce a situation where a veto becomes a likely policy
option. In this article, we aim to explain why such sit‐
uational threats have produced varying reactions from
the Commission.
As we explain in the second section, the existing lit‐
erature commonly sees this as a form of brinkmanship,
meaning that both institutions are locked in a ‘chicken
game’ with the EP wanting to assert its newly gained
powers, and the Commission shifting the burden of rejec‐
tion to the EP. While such approaches can capture the
various outcomes observed, they mischaracterise much
of the inter‐institutional dynamics surrounding trade
negotiations. Our analysis, by contrast, focuses on the
communication between the EP and the Commission
by applying insights from information processing the‐
ory (IPT).
We deliberately focus on the communicative inter‐
action between the Commission and the EP: First, the
Council has been the main legislator in trade policy since
the establishment of the Common Commercial Policy
in 1957. The Commission–Council working relationship is
therefore well‐established, meaning that we can expect
the Commission to be capable of anticipating the sen‐
sitivities of the member states. Second, the EP consists
of significantly more ‘voices’ that can transfer signals
to the Commission. It thus poses a new challenge in
terms of institutional communication. By focussing on
the Commission–EP interaction, we thus aim to assess
how the rule changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty
increased the chance of rejection of trade agreements
as the Commission needed to cope with a new veto
player. Yet, considering that the Commission–EP interac‐
tion does not take place in a political vacuum, we con‐
sider the communicative ‘interference’ of the Council at
key points in our analysis in order to provide a more
complete picture of the information exchange between
the institutions.
Focusing on processes of organisational learning, we
claim that the Commission had to pay some tuition costs
as it learned to decipher the signals emitted by the EP.
Our deduced mechanism can explain initial vetoes fol‐
lowing the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty such as
ACTA but also the disappearance of formal rejections in
recent debates. Yet, it is weaker in offering insights into
the recurrent bouts of late‐stage contestation, even if the
issue has ultimately been resolved.
Our empirical analysis comprises of two parts: The
first part traces the ratification of three agreements in
the ‘early post‐Lisbon period’ (2009–2012). The second
part studies three additional trade negotiations in the
‘later post‐Lisbon period’ (2012–2020) when the impli‐
cations of the treaty change had manifested within the
institutions’ political awareness (Ripoll Servent, 2014,
p. 569). From these findings, we deduce the role of
‘internalities’ (factors internal to the EU institutional
context) and ‘externalities’ (factors external to the EU
institutional context) that necessitate a constant updat‐
ing of the Commission’s information‐processing system.
Precisely because of this continuous refinement pro‐
cess under constant uncertainty, we argue that reading
veto threats resembles efforts to hit ‘moving targets,’
hence explaining the recurrent stand‐offs between EP
and Commission late in the negotiations.
2. Wielding Institutional Power, or a New Parliament in
a New Era
The EP’s more prominent role post‐Lisbon in EU trade
policy informed debates on parliamentary assertion, but
also provided a new test case for principal‐agent scholars
scrutinising inter‐institutional dynamics in trade nego‐
tiations. The former tradition is particularly useful in
shedding light on the EP’s motivations and strategies
to expand and apply its power. The latter complements
such insights by introducing the main target of the EP’s
actions in trade negotiations. Neither, however, gives
due attention to the communicative action through
which parliamentary power is asserted.
2.1. Parliamentary Assertion: Stories of Empowerment
With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EP received three new
rights: the right to be fully informed, the right to
accept or reject trade agreements, and the right to
implement trade legislation through internal legislation
(Art. 207 TFEU, Art. 218 TFEU). These rule changes bun‐
dled academia’s focus in two ways: On the one hand, an
audience‐centred focus gave centrality to the growing
awareness of the EP’s new powers in the eyes of the pub‐
lic. As the argument goes, the increasing public salience
of EU affairs following the Lisbon Treaty activates MEPs’
desire to ‘flex muscles’ vis‐à‐vis the Commission, con‐
sidering that politicians are subject to election cycles
(Gheyle, 2016, p. 2, 2019, p. 20). The politicisation of
trade policy hence produced a parliamentary actorwhich
rose ‘from zero to hero’ (Rosén, 2015) in the eyes of
the public and which “[became] active in speaking out
with its autonomous voices and expressing autonomous
views” (Shaohua, 2015, p. 3).
Other scholars focus on how the rule changes intro‐
duced by the Lisbon Treaty have induced the EP to
actively leverage its powers beyond formal constitutional
rules. Supporters of ‘parliamentary assertion’ argue
that the EP has “come of age” (Roederer‐Rynning &
Greenwood, 2016, p. 735) through the Lisbon Treaty,
seeking to “institutionalise [its] power in everyday policy‐
making” (Roederer‐Rynning, 2017, p. 2, emphasis in
the original). Significant contributions have been pub‐
lished on the SWIFT agreement (Ripoll Servent, 2014),
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the EU–Korea (KOREU) negotiations (Park, 2017), ACTA,
and TTIP (Roederer‐Rynning, 2017). In a similar vein,
defendants of the informal governance approach claim
that informal contact nodes outside of formal decision‐
making procedures create space for political actors to
bend these formal rules in their pursuit for greater power
(Christiansen et al., 2003; Christiansen & Neuhold, 2012;
Stacey, 2012). How the EP has leveraged its powers (with
varying success) in the area of external negotiations
has been documented extensively (Héritier et al., 2019;
Kerremans et al., 2019). From these perspectives, the
escalation of threats reflects a strategic act of brinkman‐
ship in which the EP seeks to increase its leverage by tak‐
ing the entire process hostage.
Yet, such an interpretation omits long‐standing
insights of negotiation theory, which suggests that ‘the
early bird’ is more likely to ‘catch a worm’ (Panke, 2010;
Thorhallsson&Wivel, 2006). This would imply that a late‐
stage threat is less a strategic choice and more a mea‐
sure of last resort after a (perhaps lengthy) negotiation.
The dynamic of such inter‐institutional negotiations is at
the heart of the principal‐agent model.
2.2. Principal‐Agent Models: Exploiting Asymmetries,
Remaining in Control
Principal‐agent models study an agent’s (here the
Commission) efforts to engage into opportunistic
behaviour (‘shirking’) while principals (here the EP) seek
to remain in control of the agents’ actions (Delreux &
Adriaensen, 2017; Delreux & Kerremans, 2010).
Applied to EU trade policy, most studies focus on
the Council and on the conditions under which it can
effectively control the Commission (da Conceição‐Heldt,
2011; Kerremans, 2004). While these studies are use‐
ful in assessing different control mechanisms and the
motives for triggering these, they suffer from a “remark‐
ably thin view of agent behaviour” (Hawkins & Jacoby,
2006, p. 199). Isolating the influence of the EP indepen‐
dently from that of the Council has emerged as another
challenge as the same concerns tend to be raised in both
institutions. Studies attributing amore central role to the
agent can address both critiques by looking directly at
the agent’s responses to control exerted by a principal
(see also Gastinger & Adriaensen, 2019).
Such “agent‐principal approaches” (Delreux &
Adriaensen, 2017, p. 9) have mapped strategies for
agents to expand their autonomy by shifting their princi‐
pals’ preferences (Elsig & Dupont, 2012), limiting moni‐
toring efforts (da Conceição‐Heldt, 2017) or shifting the
burden of rejection (Delreux & Kerremans, 2010). Others
have looked at the broader context in which the agent
operates as a source of autonomy (Planck & Niemann,
2017). The thematic focus on control and the efforts
to escape therefrom are innate to principal‐agent mod‐
els and suggest a view of inter‐institutional relations as
conflictual. The escalation of a threat is interpreted as
a form of (deliberate) shirking, meaning that the agent
purposely pursues its own objectives against the pref‐
erences of the principal. This assumption is, however,
difficult to maintain as it would be unreasonable for the
Commission to jeopardise the entire agreement after
lengthy negotiations.
Coremans and Kerremans (2017) show how the
Commission set up a system of additional meetings and
briefings for the Council to ultimately avoid ‘involuntary
shirking.’ They sketch the idea of an agent trying to antici‐
pate what its principals want (Sobol, 2016). This compels
us to givemore attention to the communication between
both institutions. Studies using such an approach have
revealed a farmore nuanced picture of inter‐institutional
relations. For example, Coremans (2020) showed how
the increasing access to information by the EP exposed
capacity constraints and ultimately led to the embrace
of informal governance arrangements as a coping mech‐
anism. Moving our focus towards the Commission, we
aim to explain its (lack of) responsiveness to threats
of vetoes.
3. An Information‐Processing Perspective on
Institutional Interaction
The communicative aspect of institutional interaction
is particularly relevant considering the huge amount of
information that the EU institutions exchange regularly—
’information overload’ as the political scientist Herbert
Simon put it most famously in 1971. As human beings
are constantly flooded with information, Simon (1971)
argued that “information consumes the attention of its
recipients” (p. 6). The ability of individuals to distinguish
between relevant and irrelevant information is thus cen‐
tral to the functioning of all organisational processes.
This law of attention scarcity laid the foundations for IPT.
Institutions hence need to clear the ‘noise’ that sur‐
rounds them on a daily basis, given that they cannot
pay equal attention to all signals simultaneously. Applied
to our case, the Commission is flooded by informa‐
tion from the EP and needs to figure out upon which
demands it has to act. In other words, once information,
which we define as a preference on substantive issues,
has been released, IPT assumes the recipient to under‐
take an assessment or prioritisation of whether this
piece of information is ‘worthy’ of attention (Walgrave
& Dejaeghere, 2017, pp. 235–237).
Political psychologists later extended this notion by
arguing that attention is scarce because human beings
cannot process several pieces of information simultane‐
ously. The law of serial processing implies that recipi‐
ents, once they have made an initial prioritisation, need
to rely on heuristics, so‐called ‘signals,’ in order to inter‐
pret the information received (Axelrod, 1973; Feldman
&March, 1981). IPT hence assumes signal interpretation
to be a corollary of prioritisation of information (Jones
& Baumgartner, 2005). Naturally, this latter step leaves
room for misinterpretation, given that information can
be both uncertain (i.e., the precise value of the estimate
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is not set) and ambiguous (i.e., it is subject to more
than one interpretation; Jones & Baumgartner, 2012,
p. 7). Misreading information may lead to inefficient pol‐
icy decisions and hence to a sanction. We interpret the
meaning of ‘sanction’ broadly: It is not just the rejec‐
tion of an agreement, but also the reputational ‘shaming’
when the Commission is pressed to re‐open negotiations
it considered concluded. Importantly, IPT assumes that
consequences of both correct and incorrect information
processing produce positive and negative feedback loops,
meaning that human beings learn from their past experi‐
ences (Jones & Baumgartner, 2012, p. 3; Workman et al.,
2009, p. 81). This is called the law of learning.
These three laws provide fitting premises for our
research question as institutions constitute of, produce,
and exchange information. In applying them, we seek
to add novel and relevant insights to the literature
on inter‐institutional relations by understanding inter‐
institutional conflict as positive and negative feedback
loops of information processing at work.
Figure 1 projects the three laws of IPT to the con‐
text of Commission–EP interaction in EU trade pol‐
icy. The Commission receives signals from the EP
on a daily basis (information reception; x). The chal‐
lenge for the Commission is then to first assess the
urgency of that demand for which, as we will intro‐
duce later, it relies on its own information‐processing
system, the ‘early‐warning system’ (EWS). As the law of
serial processing highlights, signal interpretation leaves
room for misreading. Therefore, two pathways emerge:
(1) The Commission might correctly anticipate the
urgency of the demand, meaning that it anticipates
the demand’s potential to escalate. The result is insti‐
tutional pacification which renders the ratification of a
trade agreement more likely (pacification route); and
(2) The Commission might misread the demand’s poten‐
tial to escalate (escalation route). In this case, we expect
a sanction to be more likely. Such a sanction takes the
form of an expected loss of authority or discretion in
future negotiations. Hence, it is not just the rejection of
an agreement, but also the reputational ‘shaming’ of the
Commission in case it needs to re‐do its work (e.g., when
re‐opening negotiations).
In accordance with the law of learning, both insti‐
tutional escalation and institutional pacification trigger
organisational learning. This means that we understand
organisational learning as an integral part of institutional
communication which is generated by both positive and
negative feedback loops. These feedback loops are sum‐
marised on p. 8 of our online Supplementary File; a full
operationalisation of every causal step can be found on
pp. 6–7 of our online Supplementary File. If we follow
the logic of IPT, information processing should improve
over time, leading to fewer occasions of sanctioning.
Contrary to the literature on parliamentary assertion or
on principal‐agent models, our information‐processing
perspective hence suggests that the escalation of threats
of vetoes is better understood as an error in communica‐
tion rather than a strategic act of brinkmanship.
4. Research Design
To scrutinise communicative interaction, qualitative
expert interviews constituted our main data collection
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Figure 1. Learning to read veto threats—A causal mechanism.
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method (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). In total, we carried out
12 semi‐structured expert interviews with high‐ranking
Commission officials from DG Trade and with MEPs
(or their assistants) from the Committee on International
Trade (hereinafter INTA). We strategically recruited our
Commission interviewees from the (deputy) head of unit
and director level because these high‐ranking officials sit
at the heart of processing information about potential
vetoes (Hooghe & Rauh, 2017, pp. 195–196; Nugent &
Rhinard, 2015, pp. 174–175).
Additionally, we interviewed trade experts from INTA,
the key contact point for DG Trade during trade negotia‐
tions. ‘Trade experts’ are MEPs which are well versed in
trade politics and are therefore seen by their colleagues
to be experts in this field. This includes for example group
coordinators in INTA but also former (shadow) rappor‐
teurs of trade policy dossiers or MEPs who monitored
trade policy before joining the EP.
The interviews were carried out in two rounds
(April–June 2019 and February–March 2020) and
included a ranking exercise (see pp. 3–4 of our online
Supplementary File) which asked interviewees fromboth
the Commission and the EP to rank ten parliamentary
signals. The results of the ranking exercise can be found
in our online Supplementary File. Additionally, we col‐
lected four types of policy documents—parliamentary
questions, resolutions, follow‐up fiches to resolutions,
and Civil Society Dialogues—to triangulate our inter‐
view data.
Our analysis includes both cases of institutional paci‐
fication and cases of institutional escalation. If we would
only study the latter, we would fail to capture the results
from the Commission’s learning processes. As cases of
institutional pacification, we identified KOREU (2011),
CoPe (2012), the Singapore agreement (EUSFTA, 2019)
and the Vietnam agreement (EVFTA, 2020). Cases of
institutional escalation are ACTA (2012), TTIP (not con‐
cluded), CETA (2017) and the Uzbekistan agreement
(2016). This selection emerged directly from initial inter‐
views conducted with our Commission officials.
To analyse our data, we apply theory‐testing process
tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 20). This variant of
process tracing provides us with a systematic method to
first reconstruct the process of receiving and processing
information in theory and then to gauge the reading of
a threat of veto ‘in action.’ This method is hence partic‐
ularly apt to answer our research question because it
allows us to dive deep into our individual‐level data.
In the following part, we apply this research design
to show that: (1) The Commission’s initial EWS com‐
prised a small network of key players within DG Trade
and in INTA and had to be updated; and (2) While this
recalibrated system later provided the Commission with
broadermonitoring capacities, external shocks could still
escape the system. As a result, the rule changes intro‐
duced by the Lisbon Treaty led to more latent powers
of the EP in EU trade policy by aggravating the perme‐
ability of external shocks and uncertainties in the com‐
municative interaction of the EU negotiator and an EU
co‐legislator.
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. The Early Post‐Lisbon Period (2009–2012): “We Are
Institutional Partners”
Already prior to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty,
the Commission anticipated that the rule changes intro‐
duced by the Lisbon Treaty would result in a new insti‐
tutional equilibrium. Seeking to mitigate this ‘structural
shock,’ the Commission constructed what one of our
interviewees called an “early‐warning system” (EWS;
Interview 11). The term EWS should not be confused
with the procedure established by the Lisbon Treaty
to coordinate national parliaments’ subsidiarity checks.
In our case, the EWS initially referred to institutional
contact nodes, i.e., personal networks with ‘lifelines’
(such as regular meetings or an exchange of documents)
between the staff of DG Trade’s inter‐institutional unit
and key players in INTA, mostly the group coordina‐
tors and the committee chair (Interviews 5, 8, 9, 11).
The initial EWS hence provided the attempt of an “insti‐
tutional safety net” (Interview 4) that aimed to uphold
constant communicative interaction with the ‘new’ insti‐
tutional partner.
The resilience of this safety net was quickly put to
the test by KOREU and CoPe, whose negotiations were
finalised not even a year after the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty (Interview 2). Although issues of exporter
discrimination (KOREU) and human rights abuses (CoPe)
triggered concern within civil society and some parts
of the EP already during the pre‐negotiation phase, the
Commission negotiators trusted in the lifelines estab‐
lished by their initial EWS (Interview 12).
In the case of KOREU, it was the Council’s Trade
Policy Committee which turned into the epicentre of a
large‐scale lobbying campaign by the European automo‐
bile industry. Arguing that duty drawback would allow
Korean car manufacturers to buy car components in
China and to claim back duties when the final cars
would be exported to the EU, the car industry sought
to eliminate the provision (Ahn, 2010, p. 12; Elsig &
Dupont, 2012, p. 500; Interview 12). This lobbying pres‐
sure spilled over to the EP over the first half of 2010:
On 23 June 2010, INTA adopted no less than 54 amend‐
ments during its first legislative reading on its own‐
initiative report, most of which were formulated with a
strong language (Kleimann, 2011, p. 23; see p. 9 of our
online Supplementary File). Additionally, strong voices
came from Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany) and Michael
Theurer (ALDE, Germany), twoprominent INTAmembers.
As more and more MEPs became open to the argument
of exporter discrimination through duty drawback, the
majority ratios in the EP began to shrink (Interviews 1,
2, 12). These developments signalled to the Commission
that the issue of duty drawback contained high threat
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potential and explains why interaction with INTA was
placed as the second most important parliamentary sig‐
nal in our ranking exercise (step n1).
Similarly, CoPe became subject to early lobby‐
ing. Human rights NGOs approached MEPs from the
GUE/NGL and the Greens for whom human rights con‐
cerns are traditionally salient (Interview 2; Dijkstra, 2017,
p. 23). Following mass assassinations of trade unionists
in Colombia in 2008 and 2009, also larger parts of the
S&D began to criticise the agreement, thus potentially
threatening ratification (step n1; see p. 9 of our online
Supplementary File).
Given that the Parliament had merely published
“a very supportive resolution [on KOREU] that had been
adopted by the European Parliament with the support
of practically all political groups” (Interview 1) and none
on CoPe, the Commission negotiators were taken by
surprise as an element external to its institutional con‐
tact nodes threatened the fragmentation of the plenary
(Interviews 1, 8, 11).
The Commission nevertheless attributed these issues
a low potential to escalate: In case of KOREU, the EP
hadmerely published one supportive resolution and had
otherwise been rather uninterested in the negotiations
(see p. 6 of our online Supplementary File). In case of
CoPe, contacts with parliamentary key players offered
the impression that the more neo‐liberal parties (EPP,
ALDE, ECR) were not willing to reject a trade‐beneficial
agreement because of human rights issues (step n2a;
p. 10 of our online Supplementary File).
Having interpreted these signals, the Commission
sought to pacify a potential rejection by appealing to
the EP’s responsibility as an institutional partner and
by formalising concessions through public statements,
thus raising the cost of rejection (Interviews 1, 4, 7,
11, 12). In subsequent meetings with INTA key players,
Commission officials stressed the mutual interest to rat‐
ify the agreements and reminded them that, in case of
a rejection, “everybody has to take the responsibilities”
(Interview 9). On CoPe, the Commission also negotiated
stronger civil society mechanisms (see pp. 12–13 of our
online Supplementary File). In the end, the Commission
could prevent institutional escalation; both agreements
were ratified by a majority of MEPs in 2011 (nya).
In contrast, ACTA and the textile protocol with
Uzbekistan which complemented the EU–Uzbekistan
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999
(Interview 8; Yunusov, 2014, p. 5) present cases where
looming vetoes escalated. In the case of ACTA, late‐stage
public dissatisfaction in the member states followed sim‐
ilar initiatives against the Stop Online Piracy Act and
the Protect IP Act in the US (Interviews 10, 11; Dür &
Mateo, 2014, p. 1202). While the Uzbekistan protocol
was less politicised, child labour in the cotton indus‐
try caused public criticism (see pp. 17–18 of our online
Supplementary File).
These criticisms took the Commission by surprise,
considering that both agreements “[were not] doing any‐
thing radical” (Interview 10) and that previous resolu‐
tions on ACTA had been supportive of the negotiations
(p. 14 of our online Supplementary File).Moreover, while
the street protests on ACTA placed the EP under close
public scrutiny, the main political groups in the plenary
(the EPP, the ALDE and the S&D) as well as majorities
in the committees for opinion still supported the agree‐
ment until April 2012 (step n1; Interview 8).
This changed in February 2012 when the German
social democratic delegation started to oppose the
agreement (Interview 10). As civil society actors con‐
tinued to raise the political heat, MEPs that still sup‐
ported ACTA became entrapped by this public scrutiny,
meaning that it became difficult for them to still vote
in favour (Interview 3). After the liberals joined the
anti‐ACTA camp in April 2012, parliamentary rejection
was inevitable (step n2b). On 4 July 2012, a majority of
MEPs rejected ACTA (sanction).
In the case of Uzbekistan, human rights issues encap‐
sulated the social democrats (Interview 8). Due to the
salience of this issue for social democratic voters, large
parts of the S&D threw their weight behind the critical
voices, thus negatively impacting the group cohesion of
the S&D (step n2b). Because the EP was now split almost
evenly into supporters and opponents, the ratification
of the protocol was delayed by five years—a reaction
which comes “pretty close to voting down” (sanction;
Interview 9).
Considering the Commission’s previous success in
pacifying looming vetoes, ACTA andUzbekistan seem sur‐
prising. However, while the EWS had provided samples
of the political atmosphere in the committees, it had
not captured information on the strategic sensitivities of
MEPs caused by external dynamics. As both ACTA and
Uzbekistan addressed only a limited range of stakehold‐
ers, did not lower the EU’s regulatory standards, and
were already rejected by the public, the costs of rejection
were manageable (Interviews 10, 11). Despite MEPs hav‐
ing communicated support, the ‘shock waves’ of public
protest rendered rejection a rational choice (Interview 5).
The EWS had hence communicated a wrong picture of
the political atmosphere in the committees and had led
to misreading the situations.
5.2. The Later Post‐Lisbon Period (2012–2020): Learning
from Disaster?
From these experiences, it became clear that the ini‐
tial EWS required recalibration (Interview 12). While per‐
sonal contact nodes which had been deliberately estab‐
lished pre‐Lisbon had certainly proven useful, KOREU,
CoPe and ACTA had shown that broader monitoring
of societal movements, public pressure and lobbying
was necessary. The initial EWS was therefore revised
by being broadened in scope and in depth: To deepen
the institutional contact nodes, DG Trade allocated more
resources to its inter‐institutional unit (Interviews 7, 10).
Additionally, more regular channels of communication
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such as monitoring groups were introduced to improve
DG Trade’s reading of the Parliament (Interviews 7, 9, 10).
To broaden the scope of the EWS, DG Trade’s communica‐
tions unit received more financial and staff resources to
better communicate with national and regional journal‐
ists, NGOs, and civil society actors (Interview 11). As one
interviewee stressed, “since then, my sense is that we
would really have to be a little bit blind if we [would] not
identify that [something] is problematic” (Interview 1).
However, after ACTA, the EP showed a particular
‘appetite’ for confronting its institutional counterparts
(Roederer‐Rynning, 2017, p. 9). It deliberately adopted
its first TTIP resolution on 23 May 2013, one day before
the Council officially published the negotiation directives.
In a section explicitly labelled ‘mandate,’ the resolution
underlined with the wording of a “clear‐cut exclusion”
(Interview 9) that the negotiations should exclude audio‐
visual services. The section “the role of the Parliament”
“recall[ed] that Parliament will be asked to give its con‐
sent to the future TTIP agreement” (EP, 2013a, Art. 25).
At the same time, criticism on investor‐to‐state dis‐
pute settlement (ISDS) began to grow within civil soci‐
ety. Following a number of high‐profile ISDS cases such
as the triumph of the Swedish energy company Vattenfall
over the German government (Siles‐Brügge, 2018, p. 14),
the German EPP and S&D delegations came under pres‐
sure (De Bièvre, 2018, p. 73). Although the grand coali‐
tion of S&D and EPP in the plenary still stood firm
(Roederer‐Rynning, 2017, p. 520), TTIP was beginning to
show the same characteristics as ACTA (step n1; see p. 19
of our online Supplementary File).
Therefore, the Commission stalled the negotia‐
tions while launching a public consultation (step n2a;
Interviews 10, 12). However, because its relation‐
ship with INTA was working “at the highest level”
(Interview 7), the Commission was “wrongly confident”
(Hübner et al., 2017, p. 852) that CETA, which was
being negotiated in parallel to TTIP, would be ratified
(step n1; Interviews 8, 11). While TTIP was stalled, the
Commission therefore continued the negotiations on
CETA (Interview 11). Trusting in the EP’s long‐term sup‐
port for the agreement, the Commission misread the
degree of politicisation and the contentiousness of ISDS
in the EP (step n2b). After CETA’s official conclusion on
26 September 2014, the political left directly threat‐
ened to veto (Interview 2). When on 4 March 2015,
the S&D cast a vote on its official group line, an over‐
whelming majority voted to oppose ISDS in TTIP and
CETA (Siles‐Brügge, 2018, p. 18). Due to these fault lines,
the plenary vote on CETA which was originally sched‐
uled for 10 June 2015 had to be postponed (sanction;
Roederer‐Rynning, 2017, p. 521).
During the drafting process of the EP’s second
TTIP resolution, most amendments which explicitly
“oppose[d] the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism in TTIP”
(Amendment 106) were tabled by the Left and the
Greens (also Amendments 27, 72, 108), some also by
the S&D (e.g., Amendment 115). The final resolution
of 8 July 2015 therefore demanded to “replace the
ISDS system with a new system for resolving disputes
between investors and states” (EP, 2015, Art. xv). In par‐
ticular the social democrats made their opposition to
TTIP very explicit: On 10 November 2015, Sorin Moisă
(S&D, Romania) directly addressed the Commission dur‐
ing a plenary debate, stating that “ISDS is the thorn
in the flesh of CETA” (Hübner et al., 2017, p. 853).
Although being ranked as the least important signal,
the plenary speech renders the looming rejection more
credible as it becomes more difficult for MEPs to back
down (Interview 11). It had hence become clear that
“having ISDS in CETA, CETA would not be… accepted”
(Interview 5; steps n1, n2a).
To avoid a second ACTA, Trade Commissioner Cecilia
Malmström and the President’s cabinet decided in
November 2015 to “make the treaty more acceptable”
by re‐negotiating the investment chapters of TTIP and
CETA (step n2a; see p. 23 of our online Supplementary
File; Interviews 4, 5). Accordingly, the Commission
replaced ISDS with an Investment Court System which
mirrored, with some adjustments, the WTO Appellate
Body (Alvarez, 2020, pp. 10–11). On 15 February 2017,
the agreement was narrowly accepted with 54.3% (step
nya). TTIP and CETA hence taught the Commission how
to find flexible and creative solutions in order to address
looming vetoes during the ‘end‐game.’
More recent trade agreements such as the ones with
Singapore (2019) or Vietnam (2020) support this flexible
learning process. As the final negotiation rounds of both
agreements overlapped with CETA’s ‘hot phase,’ they
faced similar public and parliamentary criticism (step n1;
Hindelang et al., 2019, pp. 17–18; McKenzie & Meissner,
2017, p. 6). However, as public attention was predomi‐
nantly focused on TTIP and CETA, Singapore and Vietnam
were never explicitly politicised (step n2a; p. 25, 27 of our
online Supplementary File).
Nevertheless, the Commission stalled the negotia‐
tions on Singapore while re‐negotiating TTIP and CETA
(Interview 4) and constantly interacted with key players
in INTA. In 2017, following a European Court of Justice
opinion, it decided “to take the [Singapore] agreement
and… split it in two: [One] part of the agreement [being]
EU‐only which is 99% of the agreement and a small part
of the agreement covering investment” (Interview 11).
This decision had also been taken in light of the
upcoming ratification of the EU–Vietnam agreement.
Due to Vietnam’s history of human rights abuses,
DG Trade anticipated a dynamic similar to the CoPe
negotiations (Interview 1). The potential explosiveness
of human rights concerns revealed itself over the course
of the EP’s resolution on Vietnam of 18 April 2013
within which the EP emphasised the importance of
human rights stipulations (EP, 2013b, Art. 11). When
the Vietnamese government stressed that the inclusion
of human rights stipulations was a dealbreaker (Thu &
Schweisshelm, 2020, p. 19), it was clear that the situa‐
tion could potentially turn into a veto (step n1). Yet, as
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Vietnamwas never explicitly politicised, the Commission
read the Vietnam case similar to CoPe: Although human
rights issues had turned into a salient topic, the lack
of politicisation indicated that there were fewer incen‐
tives for parliamentarians to strategically vote against
the agreement (step n2a). To still address the issue, the
Commission negotiators proposed to strengthen “the
possibility of suspension of the PTA in case of severe
human rights abuses” (Sicurelli, 2015, p. 240) and sup‐
ported an INTAmission to Vietnam (Interview 8). In their
resolution of 9 June 2016, MEPs ‘applauded’ this com‐
promise (EP, 2016, Art. 1). The agreement received a
two‐thirds majority on 13 February 2020 (step ya; see
p. 28 of our online Supplementary File).
5.3. External Shocks, Internal Uncertainties
Our analysis thus confirms that both positive and neg‐
ative information‐processing experiences have necessi‐
tated a constant adjustment of the Commission’s EWS.
However, we also highlighted throughout that, nomatter
how close the working relationship between both insti‐
tutions, different types of uncertainties can impede the
proper reading of signals emitted by the EP.
Hence, organic externalities add unpredictability to
the institutional context. While past politicisation of
a specific issue will trigger adaptation of the EWS,
“[sic] there’s always a risk” (Interview 7) when reading
the EP. Indeed, ISDS had been used in investment agree‐
ments for over half a century without causing contro‐
versy. Lobbying efforts (KOREU, CoPe, ACTA, Uzbekistan,
CETA, Vietnam), mass mobilisation (ACTA, TTIP/CETA)
and entrapment by public scrutiny (ACTA, CETA, Vietnam)
can thus create unpredictable impediments in the ratifi‐
cation process.
Yet, our analysis also revealed that this unpredictabil‐
ity stems from within the EP itself. While resolutions
were unanimously ranked as the most important parlia‐
mentary instrument in our ranking exercise, our analy‐
sis showed that these are typically supportive. This pro‐
duces a communicative mismatch between information
and content. The internal cohesion of the parliamentary
groups, most notably the S&D, is another internal fac‐
tor of uncertainty: Not only does the S&D consist of
highly heterogenous national delegations (Interviews 2,
8), but also tends to “make up its mind… only the night
before the [final] vote” (Interview 8). This late‐stage voic‐
ing of criticism renders it difficult for the Commission to
respond to potential obstacles in time.
Together, externalities and internalities create ‘white
noise’ which impedes the Commission’s proper read‐
ing of signals emitted by the EP. When analysing inter‐
institutional communication, it is pertinent to consider
this scope condition: Aswe have shown, processing infor‐
mation does not take place in a ‘clean’ institutional envi‐
ronment but is subject to and hindered by obstacles that
lie both within and outside of this institutional scope.
While IPT suggests that one should see fewer institu‐
tional escalations over time, we argue that ‘failure’ is
still possible as internal and external uncertainties pro‐
duce a constant residual risk of misreading information.
Our argument thus highlights the informational chal‐
lenges that can undermine policy coordination. Against
this background, we argue that from an information‐
processing perspective, policy output refers to the lack
of ‘visible’ output, i.e., no agreement has been ratified.
The addition of this ‘white noise’ as a scope condition to
IPT is one of the main contributions of our article.
This residual risk is furthermore aggravated by the
human nature of the EWS: As the EWS relies on interper‐
sonal contacts and individuals’ experience, changes in
the personal set‐up of this network impact the systems’
institutional memory. Considering that the EP changes
each election cycle, and considering that Commission
officials regularly move positions, past lessons may be
forgotten or may become outdated. It is thus not only
theDamocles’ Sword of ‘white noise’ that is looming over
inter‐institutional information processing. In fact, learn‐
ing itself is a dynamic process which needs to perpetu‐
ate to cope with the continuous change in political land‐
scape. Hence, the veto potential of different substantive
concerns needs to be re‐assessed continuously.
6. Conclusion
While the Lisbon Treaty has been in force for more
than a decade, the relationship between the EP and the
Commission remains in flux. High profile confrontations
have resulted in the delay or even rejection of trade
agreements. The existing literature commonly explains
these as a strife for parliamentary empowerment or as a
game of brinkmanship gone awry. Yet, both explanations
sit at odds with the rather constructive and respectful
manner in which both institutions have worked on many
of the concerned trade agreements.
To understand this outcome, we advocate the use
of an information‐processing perspective which sug‐
gests that the escalation of threats is better under‐
stood as a communicative error. As the newly gained
powers of the EP did not come with an instruction
manual, the Commission required time to gain experi‐
ence in reading this highly diverse and decentralised
partner that is sensitive to shifts in the public agenda.
Central in this process has been the elaboration of an
information‐processing system, the ‘early‐warning sys‐
tem,’ with which the Commission seeks to identify pos‐
sible vetoes amidst the many signals emitted by the EP
and its members.
This system, as we have shown, is continuously
adapted as institutions learn from prior experiences.
While this seems to suggest that the Commission devel‐
ops nearly perfect information‐processing capacities
over time, we have shown that externalities like a
sudden mobilisation of public opinion and the unpre‐
dictable responses from MEPs thereupon can still catch
the Commission off guard. ‘White noise’ is therefore an
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important scope condition which indicates that, no mat‐
ter how fine‐grained an information‐processing system
might be, threats of vetoes still have the potential to esca‐
late. As a corollary, future vetoes are possible if they fol‐
low intense political mobilisation during the ratification
stage, and if they cover issues that have not been subject
to intense parliamentary scrutiny. If the latter condition
is not fulfilled, we can assume that the Commission has
been able to anticipate the issue.
Beyond an insight on the conditions by which
vetoes can be triggered, our article aims to contribute
to a broader discussion on inter‐institutional relations.
By treating threats of vetoes as errors in communica‐
tion, we escape the simplified depiction of such rela‐
tions as conflictual or antagonistic. Instead, we gain a
more human and practical insight into the messy and
often frustrating process by which large collective enti‐
ties engage in decision‐making.
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